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DAME ANN EBSWORTH REMEMBERED 
 
This lecture honours Dame Ann Ebsworth who died in 2002 of cancer.  
She was but sixty-four years of age.1  As I am the inaugural lecturer, I will 
record some personal facts, although her memory will be green for her 
friends, many of whom have come to this lecture to remember her and to 
celebrate her life.   
Ann Ebsworth was born on 19 May 1937.  Her father was an officer in 
the Royal Marines.  She was raised a Roman Catholic and derived from her 
religion and her parents strong convictions and a sense of public service.  She 
read history at the University of London where she was known as a 
formidable debater.  In 1962 she was called to the Bar by Gray’s Inn.  Her 
practice, which was in Liverpool, was predominantly criminal with some 
family work (which increased) and some civil work (which diminished).  She 
rose to be head of her chambers.  She was known as a considerable opponent, 
particularly in criminal cases.  She was described as an “… effective and 
formidable advocate, thorough in preparation, lucid and courteous in style 
and entirely unflappable.”2   
In 1987 she was appointed to the Northern Circuit Bench.  It was at that 
time that she first met Brenda Hale who had begun training to be an Assistant 
Recorder in Liverpool.  Baroness Hale has told of how thoroughly 
intimidated she felt, especially because of the daunting experience of 
lunching with the other judges at St George’s Hall.  However, Baroness Hale 
describes how “Ann quietly did her best to look after me and make me feel a 
little more at home.”   
After 1978 Ann Ebsworth served as a Recorder in the Crown Court and 
later as a Circuit Judge.  She did not take Silk.  She was promoted to the 
Queen’s Bench Division in 1993.  This was a significant appointment.  Dame 
* Justice of the High Court of Australia.  The author acknowledges the assistance of 
Mrs Lorraine Finlay, Legal Research Officer in the Library of the High Court of 
Australia, in the provision of materials used in the preparation of this lecture. 
1 P Bartle QC note in The Circuiteer, Spring 2005, 20. 
2 Address by Sir Mark Hedley at Gray’s Inn chapel, 10 April 2002. 
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Elizabeth Lane had become the first woman appointed to the High Court in 
1965. She was followed by Justices Heilbron, Booth, Butler-Sloss and 
Bracewell. However, although at least three of that five were far more 
familiar with the varied work of the Queen’s Bench Division than the work of 
the Family Division, that was where they were assigned.  In Baroness Hale’s 
words “It was no mean achievement for Ann Ebsworth to become … the first 
woman to be trusted full-time with the work of [the Queen’s Bench] Division 
the year before the first, and as yet only, woman was appointed to the 
Chancery Division … Dame Mary Arden.” 
According to Tim Dutton,3 when appointed to the High Court, Ann 
Ebsworth suffered as a result of “that peculiarly English combination of 
snobbery and sexism” at the hands of a male fellow High Court judge, who 
even refused to talk to her.  She later had the last laugh on him.  Tim Dutton 
says that “she was formal and slightly formidable as a judge.  Nonetheless, 
she was, he says, a kindly and self-effacing person.  She was described as a 
“model judge who stood no nonsense from unprepared barristers.”4  She 
conducted a large number of difficult trials, was rarely appealed and even 
more rarely reversed.   
Ann Ebsworth did not marry. After her mother died, she lived with her 
father.  He died soon after she was appointed to the High Court.  She lived 
for a time in London in the Temple, in a flat of Lord and Lady Mackay.  She 
was made a Bencher of Gray’s Inn. She would refer to herself as “a safe pair 
of hands.”  But Philip Bartle5 says that she was “much more than that.” She 
cared deeply about the law, but even more deeply about justice.  According to 
Philip Bartle, “those who appeared before her could not have had a fairer 
tribunal.” Baroness Hale says that Mrs Justice Ebsworth knew how to 
conduct long and difficult criminal trials firmly and fairly.  She also knew 
how to decide difficult points of law.  Reportedly, she had a “wonderful dress 
sense” and “always looked cool and elegant.” She was not a strong supporter 
of affirmative action for women or anyone else.  She had a belief that talent 
would shine through.  At least in her case, it did. 
In the latter part of her life, Mrs Justice Ebsworth devoted much time to 
teaching advocacy.  She was always ready and willing to teach for Gray’s Inn 
and for the South Eastern Circuit.  The South Eastern Circuit benefited 
greatly from her involvement in the annual course conducted at Keble 
College, held for new practitioners over many years.  She would join the 
teachers and students in the evenings, accompanying them to a nightclub 
3 Communication of Tim Dutton to P M Bartle, shared with the author. 
4 Hedley, op cit. 
5 Bartle, above n 1. 
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whose dubious reputation necessitated an escape plan in case of the arrival of 
police.  Providentially, the plan never had to be invoked. 
In 2000 she was diagnosed as suffering from mesothelioma, a deadly and 
particularly painful form of cancer.  She continued with her work and with 
teaching advocacy as long as possible, facing her illness, in Baroness Hale’s 
words, “with the same quiet courage and determination that she handled all 
her professional life.”  Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss has described to me how 
she fought against her condition bravely, continuing to sit as a judge for as 
long as she possibly could.  Her ambition was to be a good judge.  It is a 
worthy ambition.  The inauguration of this series of lectures indicates the 
opinion of her professional colleagues that she greatly succeeded in that aim. 
Dame Ann Ebsworth’s funeral was conducted at Gray’s Inn on 10 April 
2002.  Her obituary in The Guardian,6 shortly after her death, said: 
 
“She leaves a lasting mark on the history of the legal world, 
and in the hearts of those fortunate enough to have known 
her well.” 
 
I am proud that you have called me from a far away place to begin the 
lecture series that honours Ann Ebsworth’s memory and her work within the 
law.  Because of her talents and special interests, it is right that the lecture 
should take a theme centred on advocacy.  Necessarily, I will approach the 
subject primarily from the viewpoint of my twenty two years as an appellate 
judge in Australia.  Yet because we have copied the common law and the 
tradition of the English courts and Bar, in which Ann Ebsworth served with 
such distinction, most of what I say will surely be relevant for this audience. 
 
THE “RULES” OF APPELLATE ADVOCACY 
 
Talent in advocacy has conventionally been viewed as a natural gift 
rather than a skill to be developed.  Good advocates were thought to be born, 
not made.  I do not deny that there may be a gene or two in the 36,000 genes 
on the human genome that is labelled “top advocate” – “skills of 
communication and persuasion.”  Such talents may indeed be inherited, at 
least to some extent.  However, in recent decades it has increasingly been 
recognised that advocacy skills can be improved and sharpened.  Formal 
advocacy training can be an effective way of enhancing the essential skills.  
The result of this conviction can be seen in the increasing number of legal 
advocacy courses being offered through law schools, Bar Associations, and 
6 The Guardian, April 12 2002. 
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other organisations throughout the world.  In Australia, we have the 
Australian Advocacy Institute and courses offered by Bar Associations.  The 
new focus on improving advocacy standards is a positive development.  It 
can only serve to enhance the administration of justice and the service of 
clients. 
Advocacy is about persuasion.  Professor George Hampel – himself 
formerly a leading barrister and judge in Australia – has explained: 
 
“Advocacy – or persuasion – involves creating or changing 
perceptions to influence the result … Great advocates are not 
necessarily better lawyers than others – they are better 
communicators.”7
 
Intangible qualities identify individuals as outstanding advocates.  But 
there is no single objectively correct style of advocacy.  Advocates have their 
individual styles, reflecting their personalities and attitudes, their education, 
family upbringing and hard-to-define elements such as appearance, voice 
timbre, skills in eye contact, sense of drama and humour and other elusive 
elements of the art. 
For all this it is possible to identify a number of common characteristics 
shared by effective advocates.  So far as appellate advocacy is concerned I 
have previously collected what I then called ten “rules” – but they are really 
only suggestions.8  They are certainly not exhaustive.9  Nor are they rigid 
requirements to be obeyed slavishly regardless of the particular 
circumstances.  They do, however, provide one starting point for advocates 
wishing to refine their advocacy skills before appellate courts.  Different lists 
could be propounded for jury trials, judge-alone cases, multiple member 
tribunal hearings, magistrates’ courts, professional bodies and so forth.  Some 
of the big ten suggestions that I have nominated will be equally applicable in 
7 Quoted in K Marshall, “War Crimes Prosecutors set to learn art of persuasion”, 
Monash News, December 2002, p 8. 
8 M D Kirby, “Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy” (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 
964. 
9 For other suggested “rules” or “tips” see R H Jackson, “Advocacy before the United 
States Supreme Court” (2003) 5 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 219; R B 
Ginsburg, “Remarks on Appellate Advocacy” (1998-1999) 50 South Carolina Law 
Review 567; PM Wald, “19 Tips from 19 Years on the Appellate Bench” (1999) 1 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 7; R B Gilbreath, “Lost Secrets Revealed:  
The Seven ABCs of Successful Appellate Advocacy” (Winter 2005), Certworthy 13; 
R H Barksale, “The role of civility in appellate advocacy” (1999) 50 South Carolina 
Law Review 573. 
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every venue.  Theologians have a list, probably for the Pearly Gates of 
Heaven.  Let me, therefore repeat my 10 commandments for your 
consideration: 
 
(1) Know the court or tribunal that you are appearing in; 
(2) Know the law, including both the substantive law relating to your 
case and the basic procedural rules that govern the body you are 
appearing before;  
(3) Use the opening of your oral submissions to make an immediate 
impression on the minds of the decision-makers and to define the issues; 
(4) Conceptualise the case, and focus the attention of the court directly 
on the heart of the matter viewed from the interest you are propounding; 
(5) Watch the bench and respond to them; 
(6) Give priority to substance over attempted elegance; 
(7) Cite authority with discernment; 
(8) Be honest with the court at all times; 
(9) Demonstrate courage and persistence under fire.  You will generally 
be respected for it.  In any case it is your duty; and 
(10) Address any legal policy and legal principles involved in the case 
and show how they relate to the case. 
 
The central aim of advocacy – being to persuade a decision-maker – has 
remained the same throughout history.  It will remain the aim of advocates in 
the future.  The need for advocates to be able to communicate complex ideas 
and arguments will always constitute the touch-stone by which an advocate is 
judged.  In these remarks I am therefore addressing eternal verities.  I do so 
with proper modesty remembering that what impresses me may not 
necessarily impress everyone else.   
In a collegiate court it is common, virtually inevitable, for the judges, on 
leaving the courtroom, to comment on the performance of the advocates of 
the day.  I regret to tell you (and I know this will come as a terrible shock) 
that sometimes the comments are less than flattering.  One colleague of mine 
in an earlier time used to keep a list of the “First Eleven” – not the best 
advocates but the worst.  He delighted in promoting new members to his list 
– and not a few judicial colleagues joined in with playful enthusiasm.  In his 
day, the list-keeper had been a consummate advocate.  So perhaps he could 
be allowed to keep his list.  Yet even he had good and better days.  Judges, 
when appointed, sometimes forget the stresses and pressures imposed on 
advocates.  I have never done so.  We all have good and bad experiences in 
communication.  The object should be to maximize the good and to minimize 
the bad.  Definitely to avoid joining any real or imagined “First Elevens” kept 
by the decision-makers with their ever observant and critical gaze.  Judges 
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should also keep in mind the possibility that the odd advocate keeps a list of 
judicial horrors. 
Some features of advocacy are changing.  Over the past decades 
significant changes have occurred to the environment in which appellate 
advocates must work.  The most noticeable examples include changes to 
court procedures and the arrival of increasing numbers of female advocates 
and advocates from ethnic and other backgrounds different from the previous 
norm.  There have also been significant developments in the tools available 
to assist advocates.  Largely these have come about through technological 
advances such as the internet and other computer technologies.  The rate of 
change will accelerate.  The impact that such developments will have on 




 Two of the most significant procedural changes during the past 
twenty years within appellate courts, including my own, have been the 
increasing use of written submissions and the introduction of time limits for 
oral submissions.  These changes have had a significant impact on appellate 
advocacy.  They have changed the environment in which appellate advocate 
presents the cases.  If anything, the changes increase the importance of the 
basic “rules” that advocates should observe of knowing the court they are 
appearing before and being aware of the basic procedural requirements that 
govern the operations of that court.  Otherwise, the available time will not be 
maximized and opportunities for persuasion may be squandered or even lost 
forever. 
Historically, both in England and Australia oral advocacy has been 
emphasised.  Traditionally for us, less reliance has been placed on written 
submissions than, say, in the United States of America where abundant 
litigiousness, overlapping jurisdictions and a large population have long 
necessitated the adoption of written means to maximize the efficient use of 
the decision-maker’s time.  We have all experienced the sense of 
astonishment on the part of American judges and attorneys over what they 
commonly see as our unduly languid approach to oral advocacy and to that 
form of refinement of the issues for decision.  Now we are changing, at least 
in Australian courts, with written submissions assuming ever greater 
importance both in appeals and also in trials.  Even in jury trials in Australia 
written submissions are now not unknown.  Judicial directions to juries are 
often produced in draft and become the focus of targeted advocacy.  Such 
directions are sometimes read by the judge and then given to juries in written 
form so that they have a written record of the main legal directions which 
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they are obliged to apply.  It is a big change from the conversational style of 
jury trial that prevailed when I first went to the Bar. 
The primary reason for this shift to writing is the increasing workload 
placed on our courts.  For example, in the year ending 30 June 1998, two 
years after I joined the High Court of Australia, 358 applications for leave or 
special leave to appeal were filed.  This number has more than doubled in the 
ensuing six years.  There were 729 such applications filed in the year ending 
30 June 2004.10  This trend is not confined to Australia.  It is repeated in 
appellate courts everywhere. 
The increased emphasis on written submissions has been a somewhat 
gradual development in Australia.  Until 1982 the High Court of Australia 
relied almost exclusively upon oral argument.  Even then, as I remember, 
some leaders of the Bar braved judicial disapproval and handed up a written 
précis of what they had said.  One advocate told me, “They will go away and 
forget my (oral) submissions” but then they will have my summary written in 
a form that they can pick up and use in writing their reasons.  It will be 
irresistible to them.”  He was right; but he was ahead of his time.  The 
traditionalists on the bench looked disdainfully at his written efforts when 
they were offered.  Now they are accepted, indeed required, as an essential 
part of the advocate’s role. 
In February 1982 the first steps were taken in the High Court of Australia 
to adopt a universal requirement of written submissions.  At first, the Court 
obliged advocates to hand up a written outline of their main arguments 
immediately before commencing oral submissions.  The requirement of a 
written list of the principal authorities was introduced in 1984. In 1987, 
further procedural amendments to the court practice expanded upon these 
obligations. Parties, by that time had to file more detailed written 
submissions covering all significant points of argument.11  The written 
submissions filed by the appellant in a special leave application are now 
considered by the High Court of Australia to be: 
 
“the principal vehicle for demonstrating that the case is one 
in which leave should be given.”12
 
10 High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2003-2004 (2004), p 8. 
11 See High Court of Australia, Practice Direction No 1 of 2000.  A R Blackshield, M 
Coper and G Williams (eds.), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia 
(2001), pp 197-198; M Groves and R Smyth, “A Century of Judicial Style:  
Changing Patterns in Judgment Writing on the High Court 1903-2001” (2004) 32 
Federal Law Review 255. 
12 High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2003-2004 (2004), p 8. 
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Special leave is the procedure of the High Court of Australia used to 
differentiate between the appeals that will proceed to the final hearings from 
those that will not.  Only a small proportion of the cases in which such leave 
is sought, succeed in securing it.  In the average year, the High Court of 
Australia disposes of about 80 proceedings, mostly appeals.  This is slightly 
more than the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of the United States.  It 
is slightly less than the Supreme Court of Canada and considerably less than 
the Supreme Court of India with its higher complement of judges sitting in 
different panels. 
New High Court Rules 2004 commenced operation in my Court in 
January 2005.  These rules give even further emphasis to the importance of 
written submissions.  Under the new rules, special leave applications filed in 
many cases, including most of those brought by self-represented applicants, 
are initially considered on the papers by a panel of two Justices.  The 
application may be dismissed without further oral hearing if the two Justices 
conclude that the application is without merit or otherwise unsuitable for a 
grant of special leave to appeal.  Similarly, if two Justices consider it to be 
appropriate, any application for leave or special leave to appeal may now be 
determined on the papers without an oral hearing.13  In such applications, the 
written submissions obviously become of fundamental importance.  
Effectively, written submissions in such cases become the only opportunity 
the advocate has to convince the court of the merits of the case, its arguability 
and importance of the issues and the prospect of succeeding after a full 
hearing to reverse the decision below and, in the process, to establish an 
important legal principle or cure a serious injustice. 
The adoption of these new rules reflects an attempt by the High Court of 
Australia to deal with the constantly increasing number of applications filed 
in its registries.  It is too early to comment on the effect that the new rules are 
having both on the parties filing applications and on the Court itself.  
However, the emphasis on written submissions is reflective of a trend 
occurring in many other jurisdictions because of the pressure of cases, the 
limited time and capacity of the appointed decision-makers and the waste of 
time involved in oral hearings that are obviously doomed to fail. 
This said, the change in the practice of the Court was not achieved 
without heart-burning: at least on my part.  Our system of justice has long 
been one of oral advocacy, performed in open court.  This system has many 
advantages.  It ensures that judges are themselves constantly under public 
scrutiny in their decision-making.  It ensures that the decision-makers focus 
their attention on the issues, even if only for a short time.  In Australia, 
13 Ibid, p 8. 
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special leave applications that reach a hearing are allowed twenty minutes.  
Both symbolically and functionally the old system had merits.  However, 
most final courts in the world have now adopted a filter of written argument.  
Indeed, many intermediate courts have done so.  They have done so simply to 
cope with the pressure of business.  In adopting the new procedures the 
courts have changed, probably forever, the precise skills of advocacy that 
they enlist. 
In Australia, even in cases where an oral hearing occurs, the increasing 
importance of written submissions impacts on the way an appellate advocate 
typically approaches the task at hand.  Oral argument is not designed solely 
as an opportunity to present submissions already stated in writing.  Reading 
written submissions aloud to the Bench would do nothing to advance the 
argument – certainly if it went beyond reading a particular passage.  It tends 
to frustrate judges who, for the most part, will already be familiar with the 
material before them.  If the judges are not, they will usually reveal this fact 
(deliberately or accidentally) obliging adjustment of the advocates’ 
presentation.  But, for the most part, oral argument presents the contemporary 
advocate with an opportunity to focus the attention of the court on the most 
important aspects of the case.  Even more significantly, it provides an 
opportunity to engage in discussion with the decision-makers about the 
central issues in the case, and to clarify issues that may be troubling the 
judges.   
A good advocate ordinarily uses oral argument to complement and 
strengthen written submissions, and not just to state them again in a slightly 
different way.  More discerning advocates will keep in mind that some judges 
may not have had time to read the submissions carefully.  In the particular 
case some will be out of familiar legal territory.  Even in the age of written 
arguments, the advocate must tread a careful path between keeping the 
interest of those judges who are “hot” and those who are not and are not 
really focusing on what the case is about.  It is quite a tall order.  The 
challenge is increased by the trend towards written argument. 
In many jurisdictions, the increasing use of written submissions has been 
accompanied by the introduction of time limits on oral hearings.  In the High 
Court of Australia strict limits were first introduced in February 1994 in 
relation to applications for special leave to appeal.  Applicants and 
respondents are limited to twenty minutes each for oral submissions.  The 
applicant then has a maximum of five minutes to reply.  Green, amber and 
red lights directly in front of the Bench and the Bar table warn of the time the 
advocates have left to complete their oral submissions.  The attitude to strict 
observance of time varies between presiding judges.  However, the daily list 
of cases for hearing usually demands that slippage be limited to no more than 
an extra minute or so in a given case.  Most advocates pace themselves well.  
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They make their submissions in the time allotted.  Self represented litigants 
find the time limits much harder to observe.  Under the new rules providing 
for disposal on the papers it can be expected that there will be fewer oral 
submissions by litigants without legal representation than has been the case 
in my Court in the past.   
Generally speaking, the time limits work well in Australia.  They require 
a concentration of mind and focus of advocacy in a way that open-ended time 
does not.  But time limits also demonstrate that most cases are susceptible 
efficient presentation, so that their importance in legal and factual terms can 
be explained to experienced decision-makers in twenty minutes.  The need to 
do this ensures that advocates usually now go directly to the very heart of 
their case.  That is why, when special leave is granted and the appeal 
proceeds to a full hearing, the first document I always read is the special 
leave transcript.  The need for swiftness of mind adds to the pressures on 
advocates and judges alike.  Not all lawyers (or judges) are at their best in 
that environment.  Some who have the best skills of celerity are not 
necessarily skilled in explaining complex statutes and authority or in 
exercising judgment as to the outcome.  Some advocates – and some judges – 
are sprinters.  Others are better at running marathons.14 Some, alas, are down 
to a walk.  A few are walking in the wrong direction. 
Unlike some jurisdictions, notably the United States Supreme Court, the 
High Court of Australia has not yet introduced strict time limits in appeal 
hearings.  Nevertheless, the duration of oral argument is significantly shorter 
now than it was at earlier decades.  The vast majority of appeals today are 
listed for hearing on a single day. Only in the most complex appeals will oral 
argument be permitted to stretch into a second day or further.  This contrasts 
with the 39 hearing days consumed in the Bank Nationalisation Case15 
before the High Court of Australia in 1948 and the 24 days of oral argument 
in the Communist Party Case in 1951.16  The former case, late in 1948, went 
on appeal to the Privy Council.  It lasted 37 days.  One can only imagine 
what those distinguished English judges thought of it.  Two of their 
Lordships perished in the course of the proceedings.  It is not disclosed if this 
was the result of the Australian advocacy, natural causes or just sheer 
boredom.  Certainly, boredom can be a peril of unduly prolonged hearings 
from the point of view of judges and advocates alike.  The trend towards 
shorter oral argument is only possible because of the increased use of written 
14 G D Finlayson, “Appellate Advocacy:  An Australian Perspective” (1999) 1 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 27. 
15 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497. 
16 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
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submissions.  It reflects the increased case-loads confronting all 
contemporary courts, and especially final courts.17  This shifts increasing 
burdens and responsibilities onto appellate judges. 
Procedural changes such as I have described present new challenges for 
advocates.  But it is important to recognise that, no matter what procedural 
rules are in place, the task of the advocate remains the same – to persuade.  
The qualities of good advocacy remain basically the same.  It is only the 
means and duration of delivery that must be modified to adapt to the 
environment within which the advocate must now commonly operate. 
The introduction of written submissions and formal time limits presents 
challenges for courts too.  Increasing workloads are leading appellate courts 
to seek more efficient methods of managing their case listings.  But there are 
limits.  Justice must be done, but manifestly done.  Procedural changes must 
always be evaluated in light of this greater purpose, and not solely through 
the prism of throughput efficiency.18  Every reasonable person coming before 
a court should feel that they will get a fair opportunity to present their case.  
The pursuit of justice is the ultimate concern of the court.  Yet unless the 
cases can be decided in a timely and efficient way, the result is a species of 
injustice of the court’s own making.   
  
THE ELECTRONIC REVOLUTION 
 
The development of electronic technology has large implications for the 
justice system and the shape of advocacy within it.  Technological change 
will drive many of the most important future developments in advocacy.19  
The effects of this “electronic revolution” are already with us.   
One example of an innovation that has had a direct impact on oral 
advocacy is the introduction of video-link technology in the courts.  In a 
country as big as Australia, having the ability to connect judges and parties at 
various locations through video link offers a great practical advantage.  This 
17 A R Blackshield, M Coper and G Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the 
High Court of Australia (2001), p 31. 
18 Cf The State of Queensland & Anor v J L Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146, 
at 172. 
19A Stanfield “Dinosaurs to Dynamos:  Has the law reached its technological age?” 
(1998) 21 UNSW Law Journal 540; P A Talmadge, “New Technologies and 
Appellate Practice” (2000) 2 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 363; G 
Nicholson, “A vision of the future of appellate practice and process” (2000) 2 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 229; F I Lederer, “The effect of 
courtroom technologies on and in appellate proceedings and courtrooms” (2000) 2 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 251.  
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technology is now employed by the High Court of Australia for the hearing 
of special leave applications and the hearing by single judges of motions, as 
for orders nisi for constitutional writs, stays of execution of judgments under 
appeal, expedition of hearings and so forth.  The use of video-link technology 
allows hearings to proceed as if all parties were at the same location.   
The design and use of the technology tends to limit the impact on the 
style of oral argument.   Whilst this technology may present some challenges 
for advocates, it does not substantially alter the nature of advocacy in practice 
or the application of basic techniques.  The human mind quickly adapts to the 
apparent artificialities of speaking towards a large screen where the listeners 
can be seen.  In a minute or so the advocate forgets the artificialities and 
engages in communication as if the listener were physically present in the 
same room.  In fact, for a reason not yet clear, advocacy by video-link often 
appears to be a little briefer.  Analysis of outcomes has not demonstrated any 
difference from results derived from hearings in the physical presence of the 
court.  Obviously, the technology makes it possible for parties and others 
interested to come to the transmitting courthouse and witness the hearing and 
its outcome.  The reduction of court and travel time is significant.  Video-
links are also used by the High Court Justices in Australia to conduct their 
monthly conferences about cases that have just been heard and which stand 
for judgment.  Such links save the judges the time (and the Court the 
expense) of travelling inter-State for their meetings. 
Taking such technology a few steps further, it is possible to imagine a 
time when the traditional, physical court-rooms may be replaced in many 
cases by virtual courtrooms.  Rather than sitting in a physical building in 
Canberra or London or Strasbourg, courts of the future may convene on the 
World Wide Web, with all participants connected by inter-active video-link 
technology.  The need for such technology in a jurisdiction the size of 
England may be less pressing.20  But in courts of international or regional 
operation (such as the European Court of Human Rights or the Court of 
Justice) or courts in a continental or sub-continental country (such as 
Australia, Canada, Nigeria and India) such links can be extremely efficient.  
Advocacy quickly adapts to the new environment. 
The potential advantages of such developments include obviating the 
needs to build or maintain some court buildings or facilities in the 
conventional way.  It could reduce the inconvenience and cost of travel for 
judge and advocate alike.  It could diminish the perceived or actual 
20 In his report Access to Justice (Final Report, 1996), 291-292, Lord Woolf M.R. 
recommended telephone conferencing for case management and foresaw video 
conferencing as a future prospect. 
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remoteness of higher courts and help bring them to the people.  However, 
such a prospect illustrates the need to think through the implications of 
adopting technology to this extent within the justice system.  The selective 
use of video technology has undoubtedly enhanced the efficiency of the High 
Court of Australia.  However, the conduct of all proceedings through the 
World Wide Web could have negative consequences.  The existence of 
physical court buildings and the holding of public proceedings there, in 
which all participants are physically present in the one place, continue to 
have important symbolic and practical purposes.  The building of the High 
Court of Australia in Canberra has, for example, been described as being: 
 
“… a benchmark in Australia for vital architectural 
expression that deliberately seeks to make the law visible, 
relevant, and accessible to the public.  At the same time, it 
evokes an entirely fitting sense of monumentality, respectful 
of the image and also the scale of the law.”21
 
The High Court building, and others like it, stand as important symbols 
of our societies’ commitment to the principles of the rule of law, 
constitutionalism, open justice, public accountability and democracy.  They 
also help to promote dialogue between parties and their representatives and, 
occasionally, the settlement of disputes.  Propinquity can also help to 
promote dialogue between the decision-makers.  Appearing in the same place 
as one’s opponents fosters a collegiate spirit amongst specialist advocates.  
The same advantages are harder to secure in a virtual court-room linking 
participants who communicate in cyber-space. So I do not see courts 
disappearing altogether.  But they will be modified as will the function of 
advocates in them.  The technology now available and the cost saving makes 
it possible. 
A further example of this technology is the future use of the internet to 
allow the electronic filing and transfer of court documents, and for the 
employment of multimedia electronic case management systems.  Some 
courts have already begun trial or pilot programmes in this area.  This 
technology potentially offers advantages in terms of distributing materials to 
all necessary recipients in the most time efficient manner.22  At the same time 
document security, where this is applicable, still needs to be adequately 
21 A R Blackshield, M Coper and G Williams et al (eds), The Oxford Companion to 
the High Court of Australia (2001), p 30.  The Duke of Edinburgh was less kind in 
his comment.  Reportedly, he suggested that the building most resembled a power 
station. 
22 Access to Justice (Final Report, 1996), 285-287. 
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addressed before such technology can be fully adopted.  If such concerns can 
be adequately met, technology of this nature offers potential benefits for 
advocates by improving the administrative processes of courts and their 
transparency, to the advantage of all concerned. 
Technology is already changing the way in which advocates are 
presenting information to decision-makers.  Electronic hyperlinked briefs, 
being briefs recorded on CD-ROM and containing not only the text of 
submissions but hyperlinks to all cited references, are already being filed in 
the United States.23  Occasionally (very rarely) such CD-ROMs have been 
offered to the bench in Australia.  So far the response has generally been the 
same puzzlement, and even lack of welcome, that to the first attempts, thirty 
years ago, to hand up written submissions occasioned.  However, in large 
trials and even some complex appeals (e.g. dealing with the multiple legal 
and factual issues such as claims of native title to land) intrepid advocates are 
beginning the process of educating the judges in the usefulness of such 
electronic materials.  Multi-media briefs open up the possibility that in the 
near future: 
 
“… a judge need no longer put down a printed brief to pull a 
law book from a library shelf.  No longer will he or she have 
to dig through a multivolume appendix to find a 
documentary exhibit or set up a VCR to play a videotaped 
excerpt of testimony.”24
 
The introduction of such multi-media briefs raises interesting questions 
about the role of appellate courts and the limits and potential to their 
function.  In numerous cases the High Court of Australia has recognised the 
constraints under which appellate courts operate, particularly in terms of the 
need to accord respect to the advantage of the trial judge in actually being 
23 The first known CD-ROM appellate brief to be filed by a party was in Yukiyo v 
Wantanabe 111 F 3d 883 (Fed Cir 1997).  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit ultimately struck the brief out on the grounds that the appellant had 
failed to seek leave from the court before filing the brief.  A CD-ROM brief was 
however accepted by the same Court in the case of In re Berg 43 USPQ 1703, 1704 
(Fed Cir 1997) (unpublished).  Such briefs have also been accepted in a number of 
subsequent cases. 
24 F Gindhart quoted in: F I Lederer, “The effect of courtroom technologies on and in 
appellate proceedings and courtrooms” (2000) 2 Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process 251, at p 263. 
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present throughout the trial.25  Such advantages were traditionally ascribed to 
the capacity of the judge to assess the veracity of witnesses from their 
appearance in the witness box.  If this consideration is now given less weight 
because scientific research has cast doubt on its reliability, there remain 
advantages in the conduct of the trial.  These include the observation of all 
the evidence in sequence with time to absorb and think through the issues.  
These advantages are commonly replaced in appellate courts by techniques 
that focus on the issued identified by skilful advocates.26  Already available 
technologies may permit appellate courts, where appropriate, to reduce the 
gap that has hitherto existed between the experiences of the trial judge and 
those of the appellate court. 
An example of this arose Clark v Her Majesty’s Advocate27 in 2000.  
That was a decision by the Appeals Court of the High Court in Scotland.  The 
Court quashed the appellant’s conviction for assault and robbery after finding 
that the presiding Sheriff had misdirected the jury.  The novel feature of the 
case was that the misdirection was based not on the words used by the Sheriff 
in his charge to the jury, but rather on the tone of his voice.  The Court 
stressed that there was: 
 
“… nothing on the face of the transcript itself which would 
have justified a finding that the Sheriff had failed to observe 
the proper balance in presenting the issues to the jury.”28
 
Yet, after listening to a sound recording of the charge, members of the 
appellate court: 
 
“… formed the clear impression that, when posing a series of 
rhetorical questions, the Sheriff did indeed raise the register 
which he used and placed the emphasis on certain words in 
such a manner as to suggest that the answers to the questions 
would be unfavourable to the appellant.  We stress that this 
25 Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; Jones v Hyde 
(1989) 63 ALJR 349, at 351-352; Devries v Australian National Railways 
Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479, 482-483. 
26 State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) 
(1999) 73 ALJR 306 at 327-331, [87]-[88]; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 128-
129, [28]-[31]. 
27 Clark v Her Majesty’s Advocate, App No C/633/99 (Scotland, 26 July 2000).  This 
case is further discussed in G Nicholson, “A vision of the future of appellate practice 
and process” (2000) 2 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 229. 
28 Clark v Her Majesty’s Advocate App No C/633/99 (Scotland, 26 July 2000), at [6]. 
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was a clear impression which we all formed and that the 
phenomenon occurred repeatedly.”29
 
In the past, advocates have sometimes complained about such 
phenomena, then ordinarily improvable.  In the future, as in Clark, advocates 
will commonly have access to such result-changing data to be deployed in 
argument.  They will only do so because of advances in technology.  The use 
of technology, in Clark (the older technology of a sound recorder) may allow 
an appellate judge to experience aspects of the original trial almost as if he or 
she were there.   Multi-media briefs, in the future, may provide an appellate 
judge with a direct hyperlink to a video-recording of the critical moments in 
the trial, as opposed to being confined to written references to the transcript 
page.  Such new technology will obviously have an impact on appellate 
advocacy, providing the advocate with an entirely new range of tools with 
which to work.  But careful judgments will have to be made because of the 
time implications for the appeal and the occasional risk that the new materials 
could backfire. 
Obviously, the use of multi-media and hyper-linked briefs, video-link 
technology and electronic document systems is predicated on the relevant 
technology being available to judges and the courts who have the requisite 
skills to access them.  The courtroom of the future is likely to look different 
from the courtroom of today.  The advocate of the future will operate in a 
different environment.   
Examples of what such courtrooms might look like in a decade or so are 
being explored in innovative projects such as the University of Canberra’s e-
court project and the so-called Courtroom 21.  Courtroom 21 is a mock 
courtroom located at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the William and 
Mary College of Law in America.30 It is described as the world’s most 
technologically advanced courtroom. Courtroom 21 experiments with new 
technologies and seeks to determine how such technologies can best be used 
to improve the legal system.  Features of Courtroom 21 include the SMART 
Board interactive whiteboard to facilitate multi-media presentations in court, 
linked LCD monitors allowing advocates to transmit images directly from 
their electronic briefs to the monitors of the judges – and quite possibly jurors 
– and a real-time electronic transcription system.  Technology such as this is 
slowly being adopted in courtrooms around the world.  Advocates starting 
today will see these and other wonders. 
29 Ibid, at [6]. 
30 See http://www.courtroom21.net  
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Today’s advocates find themselves in a half-way world of those with and 
without digital skills.  Some judges in Australia are already set up with 
keyboard and screens on the bench.  Many counsel now appear at the Bar 
table with these facilities.  In Perth, Western Australia, at least one judge, 
conducting jury criminal trials, uses power point in giving her instructions to 
the jury.  Advocates cannot allow themselves to get behind such judicial 
skills.  In the High Court of Australia during a large native title appeal, the 
judges were offered the supply of instantaneous electronic access to the 
record.  By majority, the offer was declined politely but firmly.  More 
recently, in a copyright appeal, the High Court of Australia was shown a 
Play-Station CD-ROM in operation31.  The video game was safely 
demonstrated from the Bar table by an advocate who appeared to have more 
than a purely professional familiarity with its operations.  He was justly 
rewarded with silk in the next list. 
What does such technology mean for advocates and for techniques of 
advocacy?  Used correctly and skilfully technology can assist an advocate in 
effectively presenting a case to the court.  However, the technology, as such, 
is no more than a tool to be used.  By itself, it cannot transform a losing 
argument into a winning one.  It will not mask or improve factual or legal 
deficiencies or poor advocacy.  Even with the development of technology the 
basic skills of effective advocacy remain the same as they have always been.  
A flashy power-point summary of arguments, if permitted, will not hide gaps 
in logic.  Indeed, the technology may make such gaps more visible, more 
quickly.  Yet as judges and jurors increasingly come from generation X (and 
even later generations) their willingness to sit for hours during tedious oral 
submissions, unadorned by technical aids and illustrations, will be reduced.32  
Already studies of jury attitudes have shown generational changes to 
conventional courtroom advocacy.  New attitudes will leap ahead as the 
technology does.  Courtrooms cannot be cut off from the skills and interests 
of the people who serve in them and whom they serve. 
Any discussion about technology and the law must eventually address 
artificial intelligence, and the potential of intelligent machines ultimately 
replacing both advocates and judges.  Would it be possible in the future for 
the tasks of advocacy and judging to be left to machines using artificial 
intelligence to produce case outcomes based upon the input of factual case 
data and an analysis performed through pre-programmed precedent 
databases?  Although the idea may seem far-fetched at present, so a few 
31 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 79 ALJR 1850. 
32 M D Kirby “Delivering justice in a democracy III – The jury of the future” (1998) 
17 Australian Bar Review 113. 
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decades ago did some of the technology that courts and advocates now take 
for granted and readily envisage. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to conceive of the practice of law ever being 
left entirely to artificial intelligence, no matter how quickly technology may 
advance.  Law is as much an art as it is a science. There is an inherent 
creativity and an essential human element to both advocacy and judging33.  It 
is difficult to imagine even the most advanced artificial intelligence 
technology ever being able to replicate the human element that is essential to 
our justice system.  At this stage, it is impossible to conceive of a machine 
with a will to do justice to human parties.  But even if artificial intelligence 
may not completely replace human advocates and decision-makers, artificial 
intelligence may well have future applications to aid advocates and judges.  
Every advocate of the foreseeable future will have a mobile voice recognition 
module which can respond to oral commands and produce instantaneous 
legal materials, statutory, judicial and academic on demand.  All those well 
known cases you cannot remember just when you need them - most will be 
there the moment they are required.  Already, artificial intelligence is used to 
analyse taxation and immigration processes.  When the legal criteria are 
relatively straight-forward, this technology is not far away.34
A final development that should be noted is the increasing importance of 
the internet to the art of advocacy.  The most obvious benefit is that the 
internet has rendered many physical barriers obsolete.  Advocates from 
around the world are now able to communicate easily, share information and 
learn from each other.  Hopefully, this growing connectedness will be used 
by advocates to achieve the positive result of enhancing and developing 
advocacy skills. 
The internet has also had a large impact on the conduct of legal research.  
Sir Anthony Mason, past Chief Justice of Australia, looked towards the 
future in 1984 when he surmised that: 
 
“Access to comprehensive library facilities going beyond the 
mere provision of books is a matter of vital importance to the 
33 R Harris Hints on Advocacy (London, Stevens, 1882), 3; L P Stryker, The Art of 
Advocacy: A Plea for the Renaissance of the Trial Lawyer (New York, Simon & 
Schuster, 1954), 32. 
34 M D Kirby The Judges (ABC Boyer Lectures, 1983), at p 77 describing the 
“TAXMAN” program in the United States.  See L T McCarty, “Reflections on 
TAXMAN: An experiment in artificial intelligence and legal reasoning” (1977) 90 
Harvard Law Review 837. 
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Bar.  No doubt the advent of legal computer services will 
help to solve this problem.”35
 
Twenty years down the track, he has been proved correct.  The use in 
Australia of internet-based research tools such as AustLII, BAILII, Westlaw, 
LexisNexis and HeinOnline, to name but a few, has revolutionised legal 
research.  Research can now be conducted more quickly and more 
thoroughly.  The internet provides every advocate and every judge with a 
practically unlimited pool of information.  Indeed, it is the very immensity of 
the sources that presents a new challenge to the advocate – how to refine the 
problem; how to conceptualise the issues; how to limit the sources of 
essential data; how to ensure that enough time is left to think about the 
problem and its solution; and not to be overly dazzled by the mass of 
information that is now at our fingertips from so many sources. 
Yet overseas legal authority should be cited with care.  The internet is of 
enormous value to an advocate if it is used selectively.  It is not so valuable if 
it is used indiscriminately to generate masses of unread or ill considered 
material.  This point was emphasised by Sir Gerard Brennan, another past 
Chief Justice of Australia.  He noted that: 
 
“… technology is but a tool for the well trained analytical 
mind.”36
 
As today’s judges and decision-makers view with growing alarm the 
mountains of information provided to courts by advocates to “assist” them in 
their tasks, a groan can sometimes be heard begging for the return of the days 
when one of the true skill of the advocate was discernment:  the decision to 
cut-away irrelevant or insignificant materials unlikely to help the decision-
maker to come quickly and readily to the desired outcome. 
 
THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS 
 
A further development encouraged by the internet has been access to 
international law to support legal argument.  This is another illustration of the 
way that globalisation is changing the way that advocates and judges 
approach current issues and problems: 
35 A F Mason “The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy” (1984) 58 Australian 
Law Journal 537, at p 540. 
36 F G Brennan Introductory Address, presented at the Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration Technology for Justice Conference, April 1998. 
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“Once we saw issues and problems through the prism of a 
village or nation-state, especially if we were lawyers.  Now 
we see the challenges of our time through the world’s eye.”37
 
In Australia, the most contentious debate regarding international law 
concerns its use in constitutional interpretation, particularly where such law 
expresses the international law of human rights.  This debate has also been 
particularly public and vigorous in the United States.38  One recent Australian 
example of the controversy may be found in the different opinions on this 
issue expressed by Justice McHugh and myself in Al-Kateb v Godwin.39  
My own view is that international law is a legitimate influence upon 
domestic legal and constitutional development.40  Municipal judges 
ultimately derive their authority from a national Constitution.  They are 
bound to uphold that Constitution.  They cannot give preference to 
unincorporated international law over the clear requirements of their national 
law, specifically the law of the Constitution.41  Within this limitation, 
however, international law can be an important and persuasive influence.  
Being exposed to the approaches adopted, and the ideas considered, by 
judges elsewhere, who have faced similar legal questions, can only expand 
and enhance judicial thinking.  It is an extension of comparative law.  All 
wisdom is not necessarily local.  International material may provide 
important and persuasive insights into common problems.  Ultimately, it is 
37 M D Kirby Through the World’s Eye (2000), xxv. 
38 P M Wald “The use of international law in the American adjudicative process” 
(2004) 27 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 431; J H Wilkinson III, “The 
use of international law in judicial decisions” (2004) 27 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 423; R B Ginsburg, “A decent respect to the opinions of [Human]kind:  
The value of a comparative perspective in constitutional adjudication”, Keynote 
address to the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 1 
April 2005). 
39 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 119 CLR 562.  The more recent United States examples 
include Atkins v Virginia 536 US 304 at 347-348 (2002) and Lawrence v Texas 539 
US 558 at 576 (2003).  See eg H Koh, “International Law as Part of Our Law” 98 
American Journal of International Law 43 (2004). 
40 M D Kirby “International Law – The Impact on National Constitutions” (7th 
Annual Grotius Lecture), Lecture delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law, Washington D.C, 30 March, 2005. 
41 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (2004) 219 
CLR 365, at 424-426, [169]-[173]; Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, at 625, 
[179]. 
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up to the individual judge to decide on the value and usefulness of such 
material within the context of each case. 
The use of international materials by an advocate can enhance 
submissions and provide a useful point of reference for the reasons of an 
appellate court.  Such materials will become more important in future years.  
The quickening pace of globalisation makes it inevitable that the law will 
increasingly become more international.  Municipal law will increasingly be 
influenced by the content of international law.  Given, however, the differing 
views of judges as to the value of such materials in analogous reasoning, 
advocates contemplating the use of international law materials do well to 
keep in mind the “rule” of advocacy commending knowledge of the court and 
of the judges deciding the case.  In a multi-member court, including judges 
who may hold differing views on such topics, discernment is demanded.  The 
advocate must at once secure the agreement of the judge who is interested in, 
and influenced by, such sources whilst avoiding irritation to the judge who is 
antagonistic to such materials, regarding them as an invitation to legal 
heresy.42
In the United Kingdom, the enactment and commencement in 2000, of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) has meant that the use of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and other sources of international human rights 
law in advocacy is now less controversial.  Indeed, it is now virtually 
required. Being relevant to the duty of judges it is now within the duty of 
advocates.43  Books are written to aid the advocate in this new territory.44 
Such books must be in the modern advocate’s library. 
It is not only in the contentious area of domestic constitutional 
interpretation that international or comparative law can play a role in the 
contemporary courtroom.  Advocates before the High Court of Australia have 
often referred to comparative law materials from other jurisdictions to 
advance their submissions.  Over the years, the sources of comparative 
material in Australia have gradually widened beyond the traditional 
42 See eg the views of McHugh J at Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 119 CLR 562 at 589, 
[63], declaring as “heretical” the opinion that the Australian Constitution is now to be 
read in the context of international law, including the international law of human 
rights. 
43 A (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68 at 109-110, 
per Lord Bingham of Cornhill at [41] citing International Transport Roth GmbH v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728, per Simon Brown LJ at 
746, [27]. 
44 A P Lester and D Pannick (eds), Human Rights Law and Practice (2004).  See also 
S Joseph, J Schultz and M Castan (eds), The International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights – Cases, Materials and Commentary (2nd ed, OUP, 2004). 
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references to English law.  They now extend to new sources both in the 
common law world and beyond.  Australian courts are not alone in 
recognising the potential value of comparative law materials.  For example, 
Lord Steyn recently observed that: 
 
“The Law Lords expect a high standard of research and 
presentation from barristers … For example, if the appeal 
involves a statutory offence we would expect counsel to be 
familiar with … comparative material from, say, Australia 
and New Zealand.”45
 
Whilst material from other jurisdictions is not binding on a municipal 
court it will, in the same way as international law, frequently provide an 
illuminating point of contextual reference. In the future, with physical 
distances becoming less relevant to advocacy and the law increasingly 
international and available on line, we can expect both advocates and judges 
to refer to authorities from new sources around the world and to do so more 
frequently. 
 
THE ARRIVAL OF FEMALE ADVOCATES 
 
I have left to last a development exemplified by the life of Ann Ebsworth 
herself.  One of the most significant developments in appellate advocacy over 
the past fifty years has been the arrival of female advocates.  In Australia, it 
was not until 1905 that Grata Flos Greig became the first woman admitted to 
legal practice.  It would take a further 52 years before Miss Roma Mitchell, 
in Adelaide, became the first woman to be appointed as Queen’s Counsel.  
The young Miss Mitchell had earlier become the first female practitioner to 
be recorded as appearing in the High Court of Australia.  She appeared in 
1937 as junior counsel in Maeder v Busch.46  It was a patent suit.  There was 
no gender element whatever in the case.  In the way of those times, junior 
counsel for the plaintiff was simply named as Ross.  But Roma Mitchell 
appeared in the glory of her full name - to show that she had arrived.  The 
law reporter was sufficiently surprised, or impressed, by her appearance on 
the record to draw the distinction.  It was not until the following year, 35 
years after the first sitting of the High Court of Australia, that a female 
45 Quoted in C Booth and M du Plessis, “Home Alone? – The US Supreme Court and 
International and Transnational Judicial Learning” (2005) 2 European Human Rights 
Law Review 127, at pp 133-134.  
46 Maeder v Busch (1938) 59 CLR 684. 
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advocate is recorded as having a “speaking part” in the argument of an 
appeal.  Miss Joan Rosanove briefly addressed the High Court of Australia as 
junior counsel in Briginshaw v Briginshaw.47 She too appeared in the reports 
in her full name.  In Melbourne today a set of counsel’s chambers are named 
after Joan Rosanove.  This month the Prime Minister of Australia opened in 
Adelaide the new Federal Courts Building named for Roma Mitchell. 
In many Australian law schools women now account for over half of the 
graduating law students.  For the past few years the majority of legal 
practitioners being admitted in New South Wales have been women.48  
Women such as Dame Roma Mitchell and Justice Mary Gaudron, to name 
but two, have made a large contribution to the development of Australian 
law.  The most recent appointment to the High Court of Australia is Justice 
Susan Crennan, formerly Chairman of the Victorian Bar and later a Judge of 
the Federal Court of Australia.  Inevitably such women lawyers become role 
models for countless women following.  Likewise in England, women such 
as Ann Ebsworth, have been pioneers.  They have left a lasting mark on legal 
practice.  They have a place in legal history because they were there first. 
Nevertheless, in the sphere of advocacy this change is happening slowly.  
Whilst the number of female barristers is growing in Australia, there is still a 
considerable disparity between males and females in terms of numbers at the 
Bar.  In New South Wales, for example, the most populous Australian State, 
only 14.7% of barristers and 3.2% of senior counsel are female.49  A recent 
study in Australia showed that there are considerable differences between 
male and female barristers in terms of the nature of work undertaken.  One of 
the interesting findings of this study was that male barristers were 
significantly more likely than female barristers to nominate appellate work as 
an area of their practice.50  That self-identification is borne out by my 
observation.   
In the ten years that I have served on the High Court of Australia, there 
have been comparatively few female advocates with “speaking parts.”  
Statistics compiled by the Registry of the High Court of Australia reveal that 
in 2004 a total of 161 counsel appeared before the Court in appeal hearings.  
Of these, seven were women.  This number increases somewhat in relation to 
special leave applications, where 51 of the 634 counsel appearing before the 
Court were female.  In 2004, therefore, fewer than 7% of the advocates 
47 (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 379. 
48 I Taylor and C Winslow, “A Statistical Analysis of Gender at the NSW Bar” 
(Winter 2004) Bar News 20, at p 20. 
49 Ibid, at pp 25-26. 
50 Ibid, at pp 23-24. 
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appearing before the Court, in appeals, summonses or special leave 
applications, were women.  One hundred years after the first woman was 
admitted to legal practice in Australia it is difficult to understand why there is 
still such a gap between the numbers of men and women appearing as 
advocates before the highest court.  The reasons would seem to lie deep in 
legal cultural and professional attitudes and practices. 
The Registry of the High Court of Australia has collected the following 
statistics as to the number of female advocates appearing in matters heard by 
the High Court during 2004 and 2005.  These figures include women 
appearing as either senior or junior counsel. 
The comparison of the last two years shows that there has been an 
increase in the number of appearances of women and a near doubling of the 
proportions from 7.5% to 13%.  But the base figure remains low and the 
statistics do not reflect “speaking parts.” 
 
 Male Counsel 
2004      2005 
Female Counsel 
         2004      2005 
 
Special Leave Applications 634        1027 51        127 
Appeals & Single Judge 154         477  7           70 
Total 788        1504 58         197 
 
In the twelve years before my present appointment, when I served as 
President of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, the position was no 
better.  On an impressionistic basis, proportionately, it was probably worse.  
It may have improved in that court since 1996.  In 1996 there were no women 
Judges of Appeal in New South Wales.  Now there are two in a court of 
thirteen, although women judges of the State Supreme Court sometimes 
participate as Acting Judges of Appeal or Judges in the State Court of 
Criminal Appeal. 
Why is it that senior female advocates are still the exception in appellate 
advocacy?  Justice Michael McHugh suggested that: 
 
“The inescapable conclusion is that it is a product of the 
discriminatory, systemic and structural practices in the legal 
profession that have been well-documented in recent years 
and which prevent female advocates from getting the same 
opportunities as male advocates.”51
                                                     
51 M H McHugh, “Women Justices for the High Court”, Speech delivered at the High 
Court Dinner hosted by the Western Australia Law Society, 27 October 2004. 
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The practices referred to include the prevailing masculine culture of Bar, 
the difficulties of reconciling some aspects of life at the Bar with family 
responsibilities, and the continuing impact of patronage on briefing decisions.  
These elements combine to produce a sometimes aggressively male 
environment in which it is not entirely surprising to find a lack of women.  It 
need not be so.  As Justice Mary Gaudron used to say when a member of the 
High Court of Australia, although there may be genetic factors at work in 
skills of communication, there is no evidence that the relevant genes reside 
on the Y chromosome. 
 The standard response to these statistics, showing continued female 
under-representation in the top work of advocacy in Australia (reflected also 
in most other countries of the common law) is simply to urge the need for 
patience.  Some take the view that it is only a matter of time before women, 
who have only recently begun entering the profession in numbers equivalent 
to men, rise through the ranks by virtue of merit.  But how much time is 
required?  It is 68 years since the first female appeared in a case before the 
High Court of Australia.  It is 43 years since the first Australian woman was 
appointed Queen’s Counsel.  Despite the passage of so many years, here we 
are in the twenty-first century still talking about the need for women to just 
wait patiently for equal opportunity to become a reality in advocacy before 
our courts. 
Does this disparity matter?  In my opinion, it does.  At its most basic 
level, unjustifiable discrimination of any form should be a matter of concern 
to every member of the affected profession.  When this differentiation is 
occurring within our own profession the problem becomes even more 
pressing.52  
We should be concerned about gender disparity because it does have 
significant practical implications.  Women are not just men who wear 
skirts.53  Women bring a different perspective to the practice and content of 
the law.  Inevitably it is reflective of their different life experiences.  Given 
the importance of our legal systems to the development of a fair and just 
society, it is critical that the best and the brightest are encouraged to take up 
52 Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Making a Difference?  Why We Need a More 
Diverse Judiciary” (2005) 56 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 281 at 282; B 
McLachlin, “Equality and the Judiciary:  Why should we want more women judges?” 
[2001] Public Law, 489. 
53 M D Kirby, “Women in the Law – What Next?” (2002) 16 Australian Feminist 
Law Journal 148, at p 154.  See also, “Will Women ever be Equal?” (November 
2004) The National Jurist 18 at 20-21, showing that the picture emerging in Australia 
is repeated in the United States. 
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the profession of law.  The existence of barriers to participation in the law, 
based on gender, ultimately has consequences for both the development of 
the law and society as a whole. 
In countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom, where judges are 
normally appointed from the ranks of senior advocates, the lack of senior 
female advocates also has important consequences for the composition of the 
senior judiciary.  If the number of women appearing as appellate advocates 
before the highest courts continues to be so low, it is likely that women will 
continue to be under-represented in future judicial appointments.  This has 
consequences for public confidence in the judiciary as a branch of 
government able to make effective and just decisions on behalf of the entire 
community.  It also has consequences for the way cases tend to be viewed in 
court, for the way courts of justice are perceived, for the insight that women 
can sometimes give for the resolution of issues in a case54 and for the 
perception that women often bring to the disadvantages faced by other 
vulnerable groups in society – such as indigenous people, social minorities, 
drug dependent people and homosexuals.55  It is no coincidence, I think, that 
a recent comprehensive survey of homophobia in Australia revealed that 
discriminatory attitudes are markedly less prevalent amongst Australian 
women than they are amongst men56 – especially older men of the type who 
are now occupying, or aspiring to, judicial appointment.  I do not know 
whether the same is true in Britain.  However, as a homosexual man myself, 
and a judge, it is data that makes me sit up and pay attention when I consider 
the composition of the judiciary in Australia. 
What can be done to improve the number of women advocates?  There is 
no single, easy solution that will ensure equal opportunities for women as 
advocates.  A number of recent initiatives have been tried in Australia.  They 
address some of the practical issues confronting female advocates.  Two 
examples include the push for equitable national briefing policies in the large 
legal firms and by government clients and the introduction of an In-Home 
Emergency Child Care Scheme launched by the New South Wales Bar 
Association.  It is also important to examine practical ways of modifying the 
culture at the Bar so that it becomes a more welcoming environment for 
female advocates.  It is sometimes said in the medical profession that 
surgeons are the least likeable of the specialists – they are commonly 
54 See eg U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238, per Gaudron J at 246, [28]. 
55 See A (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68, per 
Baroness Hale of Richmond at 174, [237]. 
56 M Flood and C Hamilton, “Mapping Homophobia in Australia”, Australia Institute 
Webpaper (July, 2005).  Accessed at www.tai.org.au  
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regarded by their colleagues as more vain, less communicative and more 
macho in their attitudes.  No doubt this is a stereotype.  Yet it is often 
mentioned.  Are advocates the law’s surgeons?  If so, is there anything that 
can be done to correct this feature of legal practice?  Or do we just have to 
keep telling female advocates to steel themselves and be a little brutal back?  
It is a big ask. 
The advent of female advocates, and the considerable achievements of 
some of them like Ann Ebsworth, constitute a significant development in the 
practice of appellate advocacy in my lifetime.  After all, it has taken centuries 
to get to the point we are at now.  Addressing the imbalance between male 
and female advocates, and ensuring that all advocates are provided with 
opportunities based upon their ability and not their gender, race, age or 
sexuality will remain a challenge into the future for judges and all members 
of the legal profession.  As much, I suspect, in Britain as in Australia. 
  
NEW CHALLENGES IN APPELLATE 
ADVOCACY 
 
So this is where we are.  Over the past decades there have been many 
significant changes affecting advocacy including appellate advocacy.  These 
include procedural changes as appellate courts strive to cope with increasing 
workloads, technological developments that have provided advocates with 
new tools with which to work, and an increasing number of female 
advocates.  As the pace of globalisation and technological developments 
increase in the practice of law, in Britain and Australia, the future will 
undoubtedly bring still further challenges in the practice of advocacy.   
Yet the fundamental purpose of advocacy remains the same.  Plato once 
said that “rhetoric is the art of ruling the minds of men.”  This holds as true in 
the modern age as it did in the ancient world, even if today we would include 
women, as Plato neglected to do.  The legal environment in which advocates 
operate will change.  The tools at hand will continue to develop beyond 
contemporary recognition or imagination.  Yet the fundamental challenge of 
an advocate is constant to persuade the minds of others to meet in agreement 
with one’s argument.  The terrors of advocacy, especially for the young or 
inexperienced, remain the stimulus of each succeeding generation of 
advocates as they rise to address decision-makers.  The joys of advocacy, 
after a day in court when the tasks have been well and skilfully done, 
particularly when crowned with success, are greater than virtually any other 
vocation can promise – a heady mixture of intellect, emotion and drama - 
sure to get the adrenalin flowing.  The challenges of advocacy are greater 
today than ever. 
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It is timely for us, in honour of Ann Ebsworth, to gather to reflect on 
these terrors, joys and challenges.  She like all of us, knew them all in due 
season.  That we can do this together, as advocates and judges from the 
opposite sides of the world, and still share so much in common, is a tribute to 
the barristers and judges of this city over eight centuries.  They established a 
tradition – the tradition of the English Bench and Bar.  That tradition spread 
until it was shared in the countries in which live and more than a quarter of 
humanity.  This is still the case today, long after Empire. It is an enduring 
legacy.  It speaks of the rule of law, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
We should cherish links between the lawyers of Britain and Australia.  
We can learn from each other.  We can keep and refine the best of the old 
traditions and skills.  And we can make the traditions better, juster and more 
welcoming to all.  It is our destiny as human beings constantly to strive for 
greater rationality and progress.  Advocacy is not only an ancient, honourable 
profession, venerable with tradition.  It is a dynamic, adaptive art and 
vocation.  It aspires to improve itself by adjusting to new ideas about justice, 
by using new technology to bring justice more efficiently to more people and 
by adjusting its culture and values so that all with training and talent may 
share in its exciting opportunities and enjoy its rewards.  For her perception 
of these truths and for her contribution by example and teaching, we honour a 
vital vocation by honouring Ann Ebsworth.  We value her memory.  Her 
colleagues recall her life with respect.  Her friends remember her with love 
and gratitude. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
